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 PREMATURITY AND OBITER DICTUM
 IN INDIAN JUDICIAL THOUGHT
 William D. Popkin*
 I. Introduction
 The judicial doctrine of prematurity of a suit is designed to make
 sure that courts act efficiently.1 This is not as simple as it sounds. In
 order to know what is efficient, we need to know two things. We
 must have some idea of what we want the institution we call the judi-
 ciary to do, i.e. its goals. And we must further be aware of its inherent
 limitations. Within the boundaries of its limitations there is room for
 experimentation as to goals.
 Indeed, this is true of all living things, be they viable institutions
 or human beings. The average person can walk or run at a limited
 speed, but given what nature has allotted to him, he may choose his
 direction. Notice that there can be heated argument on two subjects.
 The direction or goal of travel is the one that often catches the imagi-
 nation. But just as important is the speed at which he can travel.
 This is equally open to debate and must be resolved in deciding what
 is the most efficient way to plan activity. A one mile walk to a res-
 taurant may be worthwhile. But a five mile walk to such a place may
 result in a consideration of other ways to spend one's time. If told that
 a sick friend is five miles away, a walk in that direction may seem
 more desirable, while a distance of one hundred miles may appear
 totally beyond human endurance.
 The limitations of speed and endurance play a double role. They
 set the outer limits of human endeavour and act as factors in deciding
 what to do within those limits. The more desirable the goal or direc-
 tion, the more willing one will be to stretch the limitations of the
 actor to reach the goal.
 * Fulbright Student, Indian Law Institute 1961-'62; LL. B. (Harvard Law School).
 1. The description "Premature" was used in Kundan Lai v. Hukam Singh , A.I.R.
 1952 Punj. 115 and in State of Bombay v. United Motors, 55 Bom. L.R., 246, 254 (1952).
 In S. Ambalagaran v. Neelamegam A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 160, 162, it was called an "anticipa-
 tory declaration."
 This doctrine, in the United States, is most often called "ripeness" for judicial
 decision: Jaffee, Administrative Law (1955) (Table of Contents) p. viii; Gellhorn &
 l3yse, Administrative Law (1954) (Table of Contents) p. xiii.
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 The doctrine of prematurity is essentially concerned with the
 limitations of the judiciary. Much of the discussion of this doctrine
 describes as the outer limits of judicial capacity what are, in reality,
 the factors to be considered within the range of possible judicial ap-
 proaches.2 This is especially important to remember in a comparative
 law study where one must acknowledge that the solution to a problem
 in one country is but one possible way to balance the factors involved
 rather than a definitive setting of the boundaries of human imagi-
 nation.
 It will be best at the outset to state our conception of the assump-
 tions behind this doctrine. If a case is premature, there may be two
 basic reasons for feeling that the courts should withhold decision. (1) A
 court acts efficiently only when a concrete and non-hypothetical
 situation is presented to it. This enables the counsel to understand
 fully the implications of the case and thereby to present their position
 most forcibly. It also assures that judges will write opinions which are
 concrete in approach and useful as guides for private parties seeking
 to know what the law is. The more effective resolution of the actual
 case before the court and the most meaningful judicial pronounce-
 ments for future planning result from a fully matured and concrete
 case. (2) Courts are not necessarily the most effective means for set-
 tling disputes. Private compromise or political resolution may be more
 suitable. There are several reasons for this. A judicial solution is not
 the parties' solution. It may be best for the development of indivi-
 dual responsibility and initiative if private parties are given as much
 opportunity for working out their own problems as possible. Further-
 more, such solutions may actually be better for the parties. It is also
 true that the court has limited time so that it must act only when it is
 most needed. This need may not arise at the earliest stages of a con-
 troversy. Lastly, the public good-will which the courts enjoy is not
 inexhaustible. The court may find it best to remain out of a heated
 controversy lest the dissatisfaction of the losing party vent itself against
 the judiciary. A fully matured case is one in which these problems
 are least likely to occur, for other avenues of solution will have been
 tried.
 It is apparent from this introductory elaboration of the reasons
 behind the doctrine of prematurity that the limitations placed upon
 the judiciary are inextricably intertwined with its directions or goals.
 2. See e.g. International L. & W. Union v. Boyd, 98 L.Ed. 650, 652 (1954), 337 U.S¿
 222 (Frankfurter, J.) (too remote for the proper exercise of the judicial function).
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 The over-riding goal of a judicial system is the settlement of disputes
 by means of one person telling two or more other people what to do.
 Without a procedure for democratic representation, the judiciary
 must provide men with a reason for accepting these settlements.
 Courts, therefore, act with reference to some standard which reason-
 ble men can accept as pre-existing in those sources upon which it is
 legitimate for the judges to draw in developing the law. Concrete
 facts situations assure a fuller understanding of the relationship of the
 present dispute to the legitimate authorities. And the reluctance of a
 court to intrude when other solutions are possible is primarily based on
 the potential dissatisfaction with a solution suggested by the judges ;
 such dissatisfaction may ultimately impair the principal goal of the
 courts which is to settle disputes.
 The purpose of this article is to ascertain the Indian approach to
 problems of prematurity. We want to know how concerned Indian
 courts have been with this limitation on the judiciary and with the
 reasons behind this limitation. We also want to know why Indian
 courts have reached their particular solution to these problems.
 II. Gases and Critique on Prematurity.
 (a) Declaratory Relief : Specific Relief Act , sec. 42
 A convenient place to begin our analysis is with cases of declara-
 tory judgments under Specific Relief Act, sec. 42. For in seeking a
 mere declaration of rights, parties often come to a court at an earlier
 stage of a controversy than they would if coercive relief were being
 sought.
 The list of examples under this section is illuminating.3 Example
 (c) provides that a covenant to set up a trust if the prospective settlor
 becomes entitled to an amount of money may be examined to decide
 if it is void for uncertainty. Several problems arise in such a case.
 The development of facts may be useful since the issue of uncertainty
 may turn upon events subsequent to the time of covenanting which
 shed light upon the prior intention of the settlor. Furthermore, this
 situation presents a serious problem of wastage of judicial time for
 there is no assurance that the contingency of the receipt of money will
 occur. It also discourages the individual solution of the problem in-
 volved ; because the settlor has the opportunity to use the court as his
 3. O. P. Aggarwala, The Law of Specific Relief (3d Ed., Vol. II, 1961) pp. 808-09«
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 lawyer fori draftsmanship purposes, he may be discouraged from using
 his own counsel.4
 The majority of examples under the Specific Relief Act, sec. 42,
 involve the question of property rights of a reversioner and related
 questions of status, such as adoption.5 There is a judicial requirement
 that the litigant must sue for the entire class of reversioners. A 1 956
 Madras case 6 explained that one reversioner could not assert his indi-
 vidual claim because of the anticipatory nature of the decision which
 might be rendered valueless by the passage of time. Presumably, the
 reversioner who is bringing the suit might die and never gain posses-
 sion. The court here recognized the problem of wastage of judicial
 time, which has not been of concern under example (c).
 However, even when the suit is for the entire class, the case could
 be considered anticipatory or premature since the entire class may fail
 to surviveē It is clear that a mere hope or very contingent interest in
 the petitioner who seeks to represent the class will be insufficient
 grounds for granting relief.7 This rationale applies equally well to
 the entire class if the interest of the class itself is very remote or contin-
 gent.
 In making sure that the petitioner representing his class is not
 himself a very doubtful beneficiary of the judgment delivered, the
 courts are also exhibiting an interest in that aspect of the doctrine of
 4. Such a suit was premature at common law : Fyfe v. Arbuthnot (1857) 1 De
 G. & J. 406; 98 R.R. 151.
 5. O. P. Aggarwala, The law èj Specific Relief (3d. Ed., Vol. II, 1961) pp. 808-09,
 Examples D, E, F & H ; Examples A & G deal with clouds upon the title of the
 holder of a present possessory interest ; Example B deals with both the present
 possessory interest and unborn reversioners.
 6. S. Ambalagaran v. Neelamegan A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 160, 162.
 7. Hari Kishen v. Hira A.I.R. 1957 Punj. 89, 90 : "
 exercise of their discretion refuse to grant a declaratory decree
 collaterals avoiding the transaction are very remote and the court considers the
 chances merely speculative." This statement may bar distant collaterals from suing
 even if it is a class action. In this case a distant collateral who was near when the
 suit began but who became distant due to subsequent legislation was allowed to sue.
 Nagammal v. Agoramurthi A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 248, 249 ; (mere hope is not sufficient
 although the court has discretion where contingent interest are involved. It is always
 a question of the propriety and utility of the relief.)
 D. Gopalarao v. T. V enkatadri A.I.R. 1957 A. P. 19, 21 : (here the discretion of the
 Court was exercised against the petitioner because his interest depended upon a future
 contingency).
 of Razia Begum v. Anwar Beguni A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 886, 895 : (the court has
 discretion to assure that the proceedings are adversary;.
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 prematurity which seeks to assure that the petitioner is the person
 most interested in the litigation. One reason for awaiting the fullest
 possible development of the fact situation is to make sure that the liti-
 gating parties are the ones most concerned. This assures the adversary
 nature of the proceeding and decreases the risk of resentment at a later
 date when the stare decisis or res adjudicata effect of the judgment is
 felt by other people. In this respect, prematurity overlaps with the
 purposes of the doctrine of locus standi.
 At present, Indian courts recognize that a future possessory in-
 terest may be the subject of a declaratory action,8 however clearly they
 have noted the danger of an anticipatory decree if the petitioner is
 not likely to become one of the full owners of the property.9 These
 cases become analogous, therefore, to an owner's suing to remove a
 cloud on his title to real estate.10
 The most doubtful aspect of the cases involving property rights
 does not arise from the problem we have discussed so far, i.e. the un-
 certainty of the petitioner's direct and immediate interest in the sub-
 ject matter of the litigation. Rather there is no assurance that there
 will be a respondent who will question the petitioner's legal right
 or status. In Nagammal v. Agoramurthi 11 it was sufficient that
 the respondent was interested in denying the petitioner's interest.
 In Bhoop Singh v. Tarif Singh 12 the judge said that the peti-
 tioner's fear, not an actual challenge by the respondent, would be
 enough. And in Mankawar v. Alt. Bodhi 13 the case was held mature
 when there was a claim by the respondent to a status which was
 adverse to the petitioner's interest. The respondent in Ramsunder
 Bhagat v. Rambharasi Bhagat 14 had introduced a false recital in a will
 which indicated a future intention to cause difficulty for the widow
 after the petitioner's death. And, finally, in Jagat Ram v. Basanti 15 the
 respondent made an assertion in a deed which could later serve as a
 basis for the imposition of paternal responsibilities on the petitioner.
 8. Mankuwar v. Mt. Bodhi A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 211, 213.
 9. In Rani Jagannath v. Bhawani Singh A.I.R. 1955 M.B. 99, 100 the court was
 very strict and insisted that the reversioner bringing the class action be the nearest
 collateral.
 10. See e.g. Karimunissa v. Alfuddin A.I.R. 1960 M.P. 76, 77.
 11. A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 248, 250.
 12. A.I.R. 1956 All. 392, 395 (dictum ; here the respondent was actually deny-
 ing petitioner's parentage) .
 13. A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 211, 213.
 14. A.I.R. 1957 Patna 131.
 15. A.I.R. 1959 Punj. 581.
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 In all these cases a serious problem of prematurity exists. These
 judgments present a gradation from the barest danger of damage to
 petitioner to more tangible evidence of interference with his rights.
 But people are always making claims out of court. It is no easy
 matter to be sure that they will cause trouble at some future time
 when the opportunity arises. Nor is it necessarily desirable to allow
 a petitioner to seek judicial aid in all matters. A private and more
 amicable solution of what are very often family squabbles 16 might
 be more desirable than sending one litigant away disappointed.
 Two reasons are often given for granting a hearing. There is
 a fear that evidence will be lost 17 or that false evidence will be
 created.18 The assertion is that, far from being premature, there is
 a danger that the facts in the case will grow old and distorted with
 the passage of time. One Court did not find the danger of the crea-
 tion of evidence sufficient justification for granting relief.19 In this
 Kerala case a surety sought to intervene where the principal debtor
 had conceded the case to the creditor. The surety alleged collusion
 but was barred from a hearing because all his contentions could be
 raised at a time when he was sued. The Court did not explicitly state
 that it was deciding a question of prematurity but the rationale was
 the same.
 Nonetheless, the problem of staleness of facts may be a real one,
 despite the reluctance of the Kerala High Court. The danger isthat the
 facts justifying relief on these grounds will be assumed to exist rather
 than demonstrated. The opinions in the cases indicate that any asser-
 tion of a claim in writing will amount to a genuine threat. No
 attention is paid to its possible inadmissibility in evidence or its weak-
 ness as a self-serving declaration or to the surrounding circumstances
 which may indicate that this incident is an isolated event, unsupport-
 ed by any pattern of creation of evidence. The loss of evidence is
 even more readily assumed to be a concommitant of the passage of
 time. While witnesses die, records might be kept. Nor do the
 16. See cases in footnotes 11-15.
 17. Rani Jagannath v. Bhawani Singh A.I.R. 1955 M.B. 99, 101 ; Gosain v.
 Mehman Singh A.I.R. 1955 N.U.G. No. 1621.
 Cf. Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 886, 894 (declaratory judg-
 ments may "
 to status.")
 18. Jagat Ram v. Basanti A.I.R. 1959 Punj. 581 (creation of evidence also
 indicative of intention to interfere with petitioner at future date) ; Ramsundar Bhagat v.
 Rambharasi Bhagat A.I.R. 1957 Patna 131 (false recital in a written instrument).
 19. Kochuvareed v. Kasim A.I.R. 1960 Ker. 342.
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 opinions indicate the extent to which oral testimony is really crucial in
 the case.
 There may be another reason for giving judgment in the above
 type of case, despite the uncertainty of a mature dispute. We have
 earlier stated that the court's job is to settle disputes but that other
 means for settlement often existed. Although we have suggested that
 family disputes are best solved privately, it may be that the underlying
 attitude of the Indian courts is to the contrary. While it is impos-
 sible for a foreign observer to feel any certainty in matters concerning
 the Indian family, we would venture a guess that the emotional con-
 cern for the preservation of the family system is so great that the very
 hint of a developing dispute evokes the urge to settle it by all means
 available. It may further be that the potential bitterness is so great
 when a crack in the wall of family relations appears that private settle-
 ment is not very likely or satisfactory.20 Thus as the social value
 behind the goal of settling disputes increases, the tendency to disregard
 the limits based on the doctrine of prematurity increases.
 (b) Declaratory Relief : Injunctions and Writ Petitions
 The problem of prematurity is not limited to Specific Relief Act,
 sec. 42. Declarations are sought in many other situations along with
 pleas for injunctive relief and writ petitions and it is to those cases
 that we now turn. In State of Madras v. Champakam D or air ajan?1 a
 Brahmin sought to challenge a state rule which reserved places in
 educational institutions to backward classes. She claimed a violation
 of her rights under Article 29(2) of the Constitution, which guaranteed
 no bar to admission on account of caste. She had not yet applied
 for admission in the school. The need here was not the fuller
 development of facts in order to give a more complete understanding
 of the legal problem. Her status and the implications of the rejection
 of her application would not be made clearer by an actual rejection.
 In this respect, this case resembles the cases under Specific Relief Act,
 sec. 42 concerning property rights and status. However, judicial res-
 traint was called for here for the other reason we have noted, namely
 to allow another resolution of this nascent dispute if it was at all
 possible. The court was injecting itself into an area of great social
 sensitivity. The issue was a purely legal one, but the emotions involv-
 ed in this Communal Government order, designed to raise the status
 20. Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 886, 894 (declaratory judg-
 ments prevents future litigation by removing existing causes of controversy) .
 21. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 226.
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 of the depressed masses, must have been great. The Court was not
 unmindful of the problem. For it stated that normally it would not
 give judgments to those who had not yet indicated that they would so
 act as to call into play a piece of legislation which they sought to
 challenge.22 The Court, nonetheless, found that the " peculiar circum-
 stances " of the case justified giving an opinion though what these
 circumstances were remained undisclosed.
 The communal government order was struck down and the direct
 result was the First Amendment Act making constitutional any un-
 equal treatment resulting from social legislation for backward classes
 or Scheduled Castes and Tribes.23 It is surely a debatable question
 whether courts can put themselves in a position where legislatures will
 be quick to reverse them, especially when the Court has reached the
 tender age of one year.24 The doctrine of "finality of a judicial
 judgment " has as one of its primary purposes the prevention of a loss
 of judicial prestige due to a non-judicial reversal of a judgment.
 Tehnicaliy, a legislative abrogation of an opinion is not a violation of
 the doctrine of finality since the judgment itself is res adjudicata.
 However, when the specific rationale of a judgment is immediately reject-
 ed by a legislative pronouncement, much of the same downgrading of
 the judiciary may be produced in the public mind. In this case the
 Court could have made it clear whether the petitioner was in earnest
 about attending the educational institution or whether she was just a
 crusader for a legal principle which otherwise had no application to
 her. The adversary nature of the dispute would then be assured and
 the Court would not either waste time or prematurely involve itself in
 matters of great political import.
 In Kochunni v. State of Madras 25 the Court dismissed the objection
 based on grounds of prematurity. The objection here was that the
 22. State of Madras v. Champakan Dorairajan A.I.K. 1951 ¡S.L.. Il b , 111 ; the
 Court also considered it relevant that no objection had been taken though normally
 none is necessary to raise a jurisdictional question. This further indicates the Indian
 courts' discretionary approach to prematurity (see fn. 7).
 23. Basu, Shorter Constitution oj India (3d Łd., íybU) p. Dy (re: Article ID (*) ot
 the Constitution).
 24. V. G. Ramchandran, The Rote oj tne Judiciary in inaepenaent inaia a.i.k.
 1954 S.C.J. 95 (to set at naught a judicial verdict by an act of Parliament is not
 always healthy or wise ; but see R. Sharma, The Supreme Court in the Indian Constitution
 (1959) (hereinafter referred to as Sharma) p. 278 (nullifying Supreme Court decisions
 is just resolving a natural conflict born of constitutional and social change).
 _ 25. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 725.
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 state, as the respondent, had not yet taken action to enforce the provi-
 sions of the statute. It is thus the opposite of the Champakam case, supra >
 where it was the action of the petitioner of which we were most un-
 sure. The Court found that the statute involved changed the status
 of the petitioner's property interests upon its being passed, or purported
 to do so, and that no notification or other state action was necessary
 for this result. The Court said that a threat of action would normally
 be required if state action were necessary to affect a change in peti-
 tioner's rights.
 However, Judge Wanchoo was not completely convinced that the
 petitioner's apprehension that he would be affected by the general
 words of the statute was justified.26 He was sure that if the challenge
 to the statute had been solely on the grounds of violation of the equal
 protection clause of the Constitution, Article 14, he would not allow
 the petitioner to " lead evidence " to show that he was the person
 whose status the statute intended to affect in a discriminatory manner.
 This objection is based on the inadequate development of the fact
 situation which leaves uncertain both the possibility of the law's appli-
 cation to the particular petitioner and the full implications of such an
 application. For these purposes a threat of state action would nor-
 mally be very useful.
 As to petitioner's additional challenge, grounded on Article 19(l)(f)
 (the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property), Judge Wanchoo
 had doubts which did not lead him to the point of dissent on the ques-
 tion of prematurity. Although not explaining why he made the dis-
 tinction between Articles 14 and 19 in this respect, the learned Justice
 must have meant that the likelihood of petitioner's being protected by
 Article 19 from the effect of this statute was much clearer. Thus
 regarding Article 19(1 ) (f) the further development of the facts was not
 as crucial.
 Indeed, there were facts in this case which made it much stronger
 on the point of prematurity than either the majority or Justice
 Wanchoo owned. On the assumption that the impugned statute
 covered the petitioner's property, other private persons had claimed
 ownership of the property, were soliciting payments of rents to them-
 selves and had begun litigation to enforce their claims. The facts had,
 therefore, matured to indicate who were the proper parties despite the
 absence of a threat of action by the state. The actual threat to the
 26. Kockunni v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1959 S.G. 725, 735.
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 petitioners from private parties ensured that they could legitimately
 claim a grievance in a law suit. And, because these threats were
 grounded on a statute passed by the state, the state could properly be
 made a respondent in the case.
 Furthermore, the imminent danger of substantial injury from the
 loss of rents guaranteed the existence of a dissatisfaction which the
 Court might well have felt worth its while to dispel. Normally the
 danger comes from a threat a immediate action by the respondent, who
 in this case was the state. But there is no reason why the threat of
 action may not come from a third party acting in reliance upon action
 taken by the respondent, here the passage of a statute.
 However, there is a danger in relying upon individual threats
 springing from an assumption about the meaning of the law passed by
 the state. When this very case came up later on the merits as Kochunni
 v. Madras and Kerala , the Court held the statute unconstitutional.27
 Whenever a threat comes elsewhere than from the respondent,
 the Court must make sure that there is a reasonable basis in the
 respondent's action, i.e., the statute, for the threats. Otherwise
 the admitted burden of the threat cannot really be considered as immi-
 nent in so far as the state as respondent is concerned.
 This may be readily seen if we look at a suit against the state
 based on threats by other private parties as, in reality, a suit aimed at
 those private parties with the state compulsorily joined as a necessary
 party. The procedure is not one of suit against the private parties and
 joinder of the state, but the purpose may be presumed to be the same.
 To allow a petitioner to accomplish what is, in effect, a compulsory
 joinder of the state in a case where the private threats are groundless
 would be to inconvenience the state at the whim of a scared petitioner.
 Furthermore, the state cannot be considered a necessary party if its
 statutes do not afford some reasonable basis for the threats made to the
 petitioner. A direct suit against the state should, therefore, be ruled
 premature if the injury springs from groundless threats and if the state,
 itself, has not threatened action.
 Our analysis further indicates that the majority was too quick to
 seize upon the self-executing nature of the statute. That, in itself, is
 not an adequate basis for finding a case mature. In reality, no statute
 is self-executing in the sense that it may affect rights by a mere state-
 ment that those rights are changed» People must at least consider the
 27. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1080.
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 statute unconstitutional. The rea] question is always the imminence of
 danger to the petitioner from respondent's action, for it is then that
 the pressure for judicial settlement may outweigh the risks involved.28
 If this is the test, a " self-executing " statute may present no danger,
 while a statute that does not purport to change rights at the moment
 may be a serious danger if people begin taking steps in reliance upon
 its eventual implementation.29
 State of Bombay v. United Motors 30 presents another aspect of the
 problem of prematurity. The Court noted that preliminary objections
 had been made to petitioner's case on the grounds of prematurity
 without going on to discuss the merits of the objections. Here a tax
 was to be imposed and it was challenged as violating the limits of
 Article 286 of the Constitution, which prohibits a state tax on sales or
 purchases occurring outside the state. Reading the statute with the rules
 promulgated under it, the Court held that the statute was constitutional.
 The Court was required to interpret the statute to see if the reach
 of its taxation provisions was beyond the scope of the taxing power. In
 the lower court, it was urged that since no tax assessment had been
 made on the petitioners, the case was premature. Justice Chagla,
 below, 31 indicated that if the petitioners could show a likelihood that
 the state would levy an assessment, that would be enough to establish
 maturity ; 32 but the learned Justice also rested his finding of maturity
 on a further rationale and it is this holding which makes this case illus-
 trative of a new facet of the doctrine of prematurity.
 The statute in question also had a requirement that the petitioner
 get a license.33 The factor in the balance which this alters is the immi-
 nence and burdensome nature of the injury that the petitioner will
 undergo. The need for more facts persists and the uncertainty that
 the state will act continues. However, the petitioner may suffer imme-
 diate injury in a way we have not yet observed. He is now being
 28. U.S.A. v. Storer Broadcasting Co. 100 L. Ed. 1081 (1955), 351 U. S. 192
 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part at p. 1093 of L.Ed.).
 29. CBS v. U.S. 86 L.Ed. 1563 (1941), 316 U.S. 407.
 30. A.I.R. 1953 S.G. 252, 255.
 31. 55 Bom. L.R. 246, 254 (1952).
 32. Were this rationale alone conclusive, this case would be open to all our
 prior objections based on the uncertainty of the respondent's action. Without a
 threat of assessment we do not know if petitioner is a proper party. Furthermore,
 administrative application to concrete situations is especially useful in giving meaning
 to taxing statutes ; the court here was willing to use the rules to interpret the statute,
 but rejected the aid of future administrative practice*
 33. 55 Bom. L.R. 246, 254(1952).
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 placed on the horns of a dilemna. It is not that the state actually
 threatens action, but rather that the petitioner must either comply with
 the statute, waiving the chance to challenge it and incurring the
 burdens of compliance, or he must undergo the burdensome penalty
 for failing to apply for a license.34
 There is a great irony in the fact that the dilemma and hence the
 injury is most acute when the statute is most vague ; yet it is when
 there is the greatest vagueness that the development of facts is of the
 greatest importance in demonstrating the application of the statute to
 the petitioner.35 It is undeniable, however, that this dilemna may
 cause a burdensome and immediate injury, especially in modern society
 where the multiplication of state controls increases the pressures on
 private planning.36
 Another case where a " dilemna " proved decisive was Bengal
 Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar ,37 There the Supreme Court found that
 the requirements of registration, filing returns and inspection of docu-
 ments, combined with the penalties for failure to comply with these
 requirements, provided a case ripe for decision. The High Court had
 found the case premature, 38 urging that the facts of the case had not
 yet been investigated, no liability had been determined and no assess-
 ment had been made. The Supreme Court emphasized the magnitude
 of the petitioner's dilemma and the injury therefrom and disregarded
 the incompleteness of the factual development. The Supreme Court's
 citation of State of Bombay v. United Motors indicates that it was the
 dilemma in that case which proved'.decisive, rather than the mere likeli-
 hood of assessment.39
 However, it should be noted that when the imminence of the
 injury is due to a dilemna and not an actual threat by the respondent,
 the analysis we have been making becomes more complicated. The
 injury must, of course, be burdensome ; i.e., compliance must involve
 substantial loss and the penalty for non-compliance must be serious.
 But imminence is also required. This means that, in addition to some
 34. See Davis, " Ripeness for Judicial Review ", 68 Harv . L. Rev . 1122, 1145 (1955).
 35. In fact, the Bombay v. United Motors case was later over-ruled in Bengal
 Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661.
 36. This appears to be the basis for the majority position in U.S.A. v. Storer
 Broadcasting Co š 100 L.Ed. 1081 (1955), 351 U.S. 192 (at p. 1092 of L.Ed.).
 37. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661, 668.
 38. Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1953 Patna 87, 89.
 39. See paragraphs accompanying footnotes 30-36.
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 guarantee that the petitioner intends to act so as to incur a penalty,
 there must be some assurance that the statute applies to him. We lack
 a threat of either state or private action to aid us in arriving at this
 conclusion. It is especially important, therefore, that courts indicate
 wherein the petitioner's apprehension is reasonable, just as we earlier
 urged that the threats of third parties when based upon state legisla-
 tion must be shown to have a reasonable basis in the statute. However
 proper it may be to relieve doubts in some cases, 40 it remains a social
 value that individuals stand up to the problem of resolving many doubts
 themselves. When we remember that doubts often spring from vague-
 ness, where the development of a concrete fact situation is most useful,
 this point takes on added force.
 In this case the Court over-ruled the State of Bombay v. United
 Motors case, supra . This poses a more serious problem. In a case
 where there is doubt that an assessment will be made, should the Court
 take it upon itself to re-examine a decision given two years before,
 and followed the year before by litigants who accepted it as the
 supreme law ? 41 A case of doubtful maturity is no time to take risks
 with the good will and prestige which the Court commands.
 In some Supreme Court cases there is only a superficial analogy to
 the type of dilemna discussed above and yet the case was decided
 without even a notation of the problem of prematurity. In Vinod
 Kumar v. State of //.P.42 a notification had issued bringing into effect a
 land reform bill. Landowners apprehended that the provisions would
 be unconstitutional if applied to them ; but many of the provisions
 required further notification or some application by the tenants for
 their implementation. There was no evidence that private reliance on
 this statute was causing injury.
 The analogy to a dilemma arises because there is a discretion in
 someone to enforce the statute. The officiai responsible for the notifi-
 cation had it within his power to make the law in issue apply
 to the petitioners. But, in addition to there being no indication of the
 imminence of any action by anyone, the burden of the erstwhile dilemma
 is essentially different from what we have seen earlier. For the dilemma
 to be burdensome, compliance with some rule that is challenged must
 40. Davis, ,É Ripeness of Governmental Action for Judicial Review", 68 Harv.
 L. Rev . 1326, 1368 (Sugg. 4), 1369 (sugg. 6) (1955).
 41. Himatlal v. State of M.P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 4U*, *UD ; lor a criticai view
 of this reversal see Sharma, Ch. XIII.
 " 42. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 223,224.
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 involve some loss and non-compliance a penalty. But here compliance
 meant only waiting for the land to be taken. Non-compliance meant
 not waiting, i.e., continuing in the normal affairs of life. We lack the
 normal incidents of a dilemma which make a case mature for judgment
 because the governmental action which is challenged does not call upon
 the petitioner to do anything out of the ordinary or impose a penalty
 for his continuing in his normal ways.43 Nonetheless, the Court
 embraced difficult and potentially volatile questions involving basic
 reform of the old feudal land structure.44
 Section 633 of the Companies Act, 1956, seems to codify the
 doctrine that reasonable apprehension of a claim being made against
 a person is sufficient to allow a court to grant a declaration of liability
 or non-liability, even when the dilemma created by the apprehension is
 spurious, i.e., not imminent or burdensome. The circumstances are
 parallel to the type of case just discussed. Reasonable apprehension
 of a claim being made against a person does not appear limited to
 cases of actual threats, however good proof they may provide of that
 reasonableness. No real dilemma exists for the petitioner ; he is a
 worried man and nothing else, waiting to be sued or prosecuted for
 breach of his duty as a director of a corporation. It is true that these
 cases under section 633 are unlikely to contain difficult constitutional
 questions; so we need not fear premature decision on such issues. But,
 in a case where the claim feared is a private one, the chance of an out-
 of-court settlement may be lost ; and, if the director of the corporation
 fears a public prosecution, the court's time may be wasted if the state
 fails to take the anticipated action.
 The argument in favour of a judicial settlement under section 633
 must be based on the theory that it is important to society that these
 doubts be removed and a further development of the dispute be
 avoided. There is no reason to withhold adjudication for the purpose
 43. In Dunichand v. Deputy Commissioner A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 150, 151 a tenant was
 in fear of eviction. Compliance with the law meant waiting for eviction while non-
 compliance meant continuing his normal life. Here the petitioner withdrew his
 petition since his allotment of land had not yet been cancelled.
 44. False dilemmas existed also in Hathising Mfg. Co. v. Union of India A.I.R.
 1960 S.C. 923, where factory owners sought an adjudication that they need not pay
 compensation upon the closing of their undertakings even though no one had yet
 demanded money from petitioners ; and in State of Rajastan v. Pratap Singh A.I.R.
 1960 S.C. 1208, .where petitioners challenged a regulation exempting Muslims and
 Harijans from paying a tax for police protection even though extra police had not
 been hired and no tax had been threatened.
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 of concretizing facts since the alleged breach of duty must already have
 occurred. It may well be that in a developing economy doubts among
 the managers of a business concerning their liability might have a
 paralyzing effect which the society can ill afford.45 Even in the
 absence of an actual threat or a real dilemma , therefore, the harm to a
 director from his state of worry may be of such social importance as to
 be a legal injury. The importance of resolving these doubts would
 then outweigh the desirability of allowing a potentially more amicable
 private compromise or of saving judicial time. Such a rationale
 would not limit the operation of section 633 to petitioners who feared
 a private claim, 46 but would extend to a fear of public prosecution as
 well.47 However, the willingness to step in where doubts exist among
 directors of corporations does not mean that the courts must grasp at
 every legal issue where a petitioner has some fear of adverse legal
 consequences.
 Several of the points examined in our previous analysis were
 recognized by the Supreme Court in Dr. JV. B. Khar e v. Election Commis-
 sion of Indiai A citizen and prospective member of the Lok Sabha
 sought to prevent the Election Commission from proceeding with the
 polling for the election of the President of India. Under the Consti-
 tution, Article 71(1), the Court is required to resolve doubts concerning
 the election. The Supreme Court first noted, without deciding, the
 " extreme contention " of the petitioner that the doubts need not be
 well founded before the Court is required to hear the petition. The
 existence of a well-founded doubt is analogous to the requirement of a
 threat of action by the respondent or an imminent and burdensome
 dilemma in our prior discussions.
 45. Doubts are often required to be dispelled by the Companies Act before a
 concrete case arises. Reduction of share capital (sec. 100) and alteration of the
 Memorandum of Incorporation (sec. 17) require judicial approval despite the absence
 of a complaint.
 A similar power of judicial review in advance of a complaint is shown by the
 Industrial Tribunal's approval of out-of-court compromises; Krishnan Kutty Nair v.
 Industrial Tribunal A.I.R. 1960 Ker. 31, 34 (prevent over-reaching by a strong
 employer).
 46. It was so limited by Dan Singh v. Registrar of Companies A.l.K. lybU All. 160,
 161.
 47. In re Bank of Deccan Ltd. A.I.R. I960 Ker. 15, lb ; that this case was the
 correct interpretation is made clear by the 1960 amendments to the Companies Act,
 1956, sec. 633 (2), adopting this view.
 48. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 694.
This content downloaded from 129.79.132.155 on Fri, 28 Jul 2017 18:02:13 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 246 PREMATURITY AND OBITER DICTUM
 However, the Court assumed the existence of a well-founded doubt
 and turned to the question of when such doubts are to be resolved.
 This question has its parallel in our former discussion of whether the
 injury, even though it is imminent and burdensome, should be the
 subject of a suit at the present time when it would cause the Court to
 interfere with other means of solution or endanger its prestige by
 involvement in politically heated controversy. The Court held that
 the election process must be completed first and it laid great stress upon
 the general interest of the people in not postponing the election, rather
 than on the grave doubts of the present petitioners.
 There was at work here a consciousness of the extent to which an
 adjudication of a premature case may interfere with other processes of
 social experimentation equally as important socially as the resolution of
 doubts and dilemmas.49 The Court was also probably aware of the
 danger of involvement in a matter of great public concern. And yet
 in cases discussed earlier the Court showed no concern for the social
 value of experimentation with statutes, preferring to relieve doubts in
 advance of the application of those statutes. Adjudication of a pre-
 mature controversy where state action is challenged deprives the nor-
 mally inarticulate public of its right to political experimentation by
 granting the articulate petitioner the answers to questions about his
 future security.50
 Nor have Indian courts always been as concerned with the internal
 political process as the Supreme Court was in the N. B. Khare case,
 49. The reluctance to interfere with other non-judicial processes of solution finds
 a parallel in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Like prematurity,
 the purposes are two-fold : there is hope that the administrative tribunal will, through
 its expertise and familiarity with the subject of litigation, better develop the fact
 situation so that all of its implications will be understood ; and the courts may save
 time or avoid difficult issues by allowing the administrative tribunal to attempt its
 solution. See. e.g. N. S. Assurance Co. v. Mahal Singh A.I.R. 1960 Punj. 406 wherein
 the Court held that the Tribunal's findings were only a report to the Insurance Claims
 Board and were not final, i.e., they were subject to further administrative review and
 elucidation ; but, even if they were final, the Court went on to say that the Board
 could dispose of the case as it liked, given the final conclusion as to the facts, and the
 High Court might never have to deal with the problem.
 50. A similar reluctance to adjudicate where it would interfere with the political
 process was shown by the High Court in Bharabendra v. State of Assam A.I.R. 1953
 Assam 162 (petitioner cannot challenge legislation still in the stages of a bill) and in
 Nirmal Bose v. Union of India A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 506, 518 (the Court refused to give judg-
 ment on complicated constitutional questions in advance of a firm decision by the
 Prime Minister to act in a way which raised those issues, i.e., to dispense with the
 approval of Parliament and order West Bengal to implement a mere executive order).
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 supra . In Bombay Municipal Corpn . v. Ramchandra ,51 the Court held that
 the consideration by the municipality of a resolution was mature for
 an injunction. The Court was urged to wait until the resolution was
 passed but it rejected this contention on the grounds that the court
 need not wait until damage is done if there is a likelihood of damage.
 The Court did not analyze the voting structure in the municipality to
 explain this likelihood. Nor was any concern shown for the fact that
 they were injecting the judiciary into the middle of a heated political
 controversy, for the resolution dealt with the Communist government
 in the State of Kerala.
 In Allen Berry Co. v. Vivian Bose,52 the Court was asked to review
 some aspects of a commission appointed to look into business practices.
 There was nothing in the case to indicate that the points examined had
 become relevant in any concrete case. It was admitted that no one
 had yet claimed the privelege against self-incrimination. Nor does it
 appear that the bias of the commission members, the justness of the
 procedures or the appointment of investigating officers had caused any
 danger to the petitioner. Yet the Court was willing to decide that
 bias was not a disqualification, that the procedures were just, that offi-
 cers could be appointed to investigate, and that the privelege against
 self-incrimination could be claimed. Petitioner thus obtained a comp-
 lete canvassing of the activities of a body assigned to do investigation
 for the purposes of suggesting legislation in advance of any threat or
 injury to himself.53
 III. Gases and Critique on Obiter Dictum
 Another method by which courts may anticipate questions not
 necessary for decision is by giving obiter dictum. Dictum may have
 all the dangers of a premature judgment. The facts and the argu-
 ments on the point on which the dictum is issued may be vague and
 undeveloped. Furthermore, the court may intrude upon sensitive areas
 where other solutions have yet to be tried and for which other solutions
 may be better. However, the primary arguments in favour of taking
 cases of doubtful maturity do not exist where dictum is concerned.
 Those arguments were based on the danger of the development of
 51. A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 58.
 52. A.I.R. 1960 Punj. 86.
 53. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538, 546-47
 (investigative bodies with power to recommend, but not to enforce, are of great
 importance to the government in deciding how to legislate).
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 doubts into unmanageable disputes and the social cost to a developing
 economy of such doubts. But dictum, by definition, is beyond the
 holding in a case. The need for settling doubts and disputes in the
 particular case before the court has been fulfilled by that holding. On
 the other hand, dictum may serve a useful purpose in leading the law
 in the direction which it will take in the future. Unnecessary pro-
 nouncements, if not recklessly anticipatory of future questions or im-
 pinging upon sensitive political areas, may encourage the kind of
 judicial debate which is the stuff of creative judicial law-making.54
 Two very different kinds of dictum must be noted at the outset :
 (1) the court may refuse to discuss a point of law applicable to the facts
 of the case, but unnecessary for decision of the case because another
 legal holding made it superfluous; 55 (2) or the court may refuse to make
 a statement of law broader than the actual facts of the case require.56
 The use of the two types of dictum may have different risks. In
 the first case, it is likely that the relation of the law to the facts in the
 case has been thoroughly argued. The main reasons for withholding
 judicial pronouncement are the unwillingness to inject the court into
 difficult and far-reaching questions of law until necessary,57 the wast-
 age of judicial time, and the risk that the judges will not really concern
 themselves with the legal reasoning behind their assertions.
 Thus, in Delhi Cloth & Gen . Mills Co. v. Harnam Singh ,58 the Court
 refused to decide a question which " bristled with difficulties " because
 it was unnecessary in view of the holding in the case. And in State of
 Madras v. Gurviah Naidu 59 the Supreme Court deftly avoided a difficult
 54. See Surajmal v. State of M. P. (FB) A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 103, 110-11.
 55. Abdul Khan v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 355, 356.
 56. State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 10, 15; an exhaustive analysis
 of Articles 21 (1) & (2) of the Constitution was withheld and decision limited to the
 application of that Fundamental Right to the facts of the particular case.
 57. Two examples from High Court cases will demonstrate this involvement m
 difficult and important questions: Debi Soren v. The State A.I.R. 1954 Patna 254, 255-60
 contained a long dictum supporting the constitutionality of a statute which did not
 apply to the defendants in the case ; and in Nirmal Bose v. Union of India A.I.R. 1959
 Cal. 506, the Justice said that the central government's action was not immune from
 judicial scrutiny as an Act of State, that relief could be given against West Bengal, and
 suggested that executive action might be unconstitutional without legislative approval
 - all this despite the fact that materials were inadequate for a final solution to be
 reached, p. 509, and governmental action was at too premature a stage for final
 decision to issue, p. 518.
 58. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 590, 597.,
 $9. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 158, 161^62.
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 issue concerning the propriety of the High Court's granting of a certifi-
 cate of fitness for appeal to the higher Court.60 The need for that
 certificate was dispensed with by the granting of special leave to appeal.
 There are numerous other cases where the Supreme Court refused to
 discuss points of law because a decision on another legal issue made it
 unnecessary.61
 With the second kind of dictum, in addition to the above difficul-
 ties, we also have a grave risk that the application of the overly broad
 statement of law to fact situations not before the court will be inade-
 quately understood and argued. 62 Therefore, in The Supdt.> Central
 Prison v. Dr . Lohia 63 the Court refused to say whether a statute, held
 to be an unreasonable restriction upon a Fundamental Right, could be
 redrafted to avoid a claim of unreasonableness in the absence of a
 particular case presenting this question. And in Basheshar Math v. I .
 T. Commr ,64 two judges rigidly limited the issue of individual waiver
 of Fundamental Rights to Article 14 of the Constitution which alone
 was relevant in the case, refusing to become involved with the general
 question of waiver of Fundamental Rights.
 However, the Court is not of one mind on this issue and has often
 yielded to the impulse to speak on a point of law. Even in the Delhi
 60. A similar desire to avoid difficult constitutional questions was shown m
 Aswini Kumar vē Arabinda Bose A.I.K. 1952 S.C. 369, 370 (" . . . we desire to guard
 ourselves against being taken to have decided that a proceeding under Article 32
 would lie after an application under Article 226 for the same relief on the same facts
 had been rejected after due inquiry by a High Court. We express no opinion on
 that point."). See also Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad A.I.R. 1950 S.C.
 217, 226.
 The policy of avoidance of such issues is built into Article 228 of the Constitution
 where the High Court must decide a question of constitutional law only if it is neces-
 sary for the disposal of the case.
 61. S. Gurmel Singh v. Pratep Singh A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 122, 128; Abdul Shakur
 v. Rikhab Chand A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 52, 56 ; Shyam Behari v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1957 S.C.
 320,324; Pathak <5- Sons v. I.-T. Commr. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 456, 459; State of Bombay
 v. Narottamdas A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 69, 75.
 62. A possible exception to this is the unusual case where the more general
 proposition of law is treated as being raised by the specific facts of the case, to the
 explicit exclusion of narrower points of law. This occurred in Central Bank of India
 v. Their Workmen A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 12, 28. This Court refused to answer two questions
 about specific types of salary bonuses involved in the case, because argument was
 presented only in terms relating to salary bonuses in general and no evidence had
 been presented on the more specific points.
 63. A.I.R. 1960 S C. 634, 642.
 64. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149, 157.
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 Cloth & Gen . Mills v. Harnam Singh case,65 after noting the difficulties of
 the issue, the Court indicated in which direction it was leaning even
 though refusing to give a final opinion. And in Basheshar Nath v.
 /. T. Gommr.,66 two justices did not limit their opinions to the
 question of waiver of Article 14 rights but specifically made their re-
 marks applicable to other rights not at issue in the case.67
 The willingness to hint at broader holdings than necessary
 has led to constitutional amendments being passed. In Saghir
 Ahmad v. State of U.P .68 the Court gave a gratuitous hint that
 state monopolies may violate Article 301, 69 unless they impose
 reasonable restrictions on private enterprise. No decision on this point
 was necessary since the case was disposed of on other grounds. But
 the result was Clause 4 of the Fourth Amendment Act, assuring the
 continuation of state schemes of public ownership as against attack
 based on Article 301. 70 The solemn step of a constitutional amendment
 was precipitated by a casual and unnecessary dictum. Indeed, it was
 not ēven dictum. It was an outlining of the arguments pro and con
 with an indication of possible solutions. Such is the danger of even
 the most explicitly non-authoritative pronouncements.
 It has been suggested that these amendments following judicial
 statements do not cause damage to the Supreme Court.71 But it can-
 not help matters when the people tell the Court that it is wrong about
 the fundamental desires of a nation. It is, of course, true that the
 Court is expected to maintain strict impartiality and aloofness from
 politics. However, it is equally essential that the public does not
 consider the Court to reside in an ivory tower. Confidence in the
 judiciary depends on both extremes being avoided. Sensitivity to the
 broad social aims of the people is not concern with politics. When a
 court finds itself in continual disagreement with the country on its
 basic law, it runs a risk of losing the prestige and confidence on which
 its power to command respect for its decisions depends. It is certainly
 not inadvisable for a court to avoid such a clash by avoiding un-
 necessary dictum.
 65. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 590.
 66. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149.
 67. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149, 162 (Bhagwati, J.), 185 (K. Subba Rao, J.).
 68. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 728, 741-42.
 69. This Article guarantees free trade, commerce and intercourse throughout
 India.
 70. Amendment embodied iti Article 305 ; see Sharma, p. 275»
 71. Sharma, p. 278.
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 If we turn to the High Courts, we find a definite fondness for
 dictum, although there are many cases which reject such a practice.72
 There is a variety of obiter ranging from a hint at possible solutions,73
 to comments on possible solutions,74 to an elaborate discussion of the
 legal issues involved.75 Such an elaborate discussion may at times be
 difficult to distinguish from an alternative holding.76 An alternative
 holding is, by virtue of being a holding, dispositive of the case before
 the court ; but it shares with dictum the characteristic of being un-
 necessary, because another holding is sufficient to dispose of the petition-
 er's pleai The dictum which may be confused with an alternative
 holding is not the statement of law too broad for the facts of the case.
 This could never be confused with an alternative holding, because a
 a holding must refer to those facts. It is rather the dictum which is
 unnecessary because another statement of law disposes of the case. The
 difference between such dictum and an alternative holding must rest
 largely on the intention of the judges. Since the point is likely to have
 been throughly argued because of the kind of dictum involved, the
 real question is whether or not the judges have fully applied their
 minds to the question and given a considered judgment, rather than
 a casual or off-hand statement of law. If the statement is considered,
 the dictum rises to the level of being an alternative holding and the
 main arguments against such opinions remain the wastage of judicial
 time and premature involvement in difficult and far-reaching questions
 of law.
 One High Court refused to give a legal opinion despite its specific
 notation that full arguments had been made before it.77 However,
 other courts have spoken when argument was presented for various
 reasons. Sometimes it is considered sufficient that counsel have fully
 72. Rameshwar v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1960 Patna 6, 8 ; Sadasiva Iyer v. State of
 Kerala A.I.R. 1960 Ker. 327, 329; Munsha Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1960 Punj.
 317, 322 ; Anand Municipality v. Union of India A.I.R. 1960 Guj. 40,43; Genamal
 v. Ramaswamy A.I.R. 1960 A. P. 465, 470.
 73. RameshwarPrasadv.ShyamBeharilalAJ.il . 1960 All. 741,743; Smt. Fulkala
 v. Nathu Ram A.I.R. 1960 Patna 480, 484.
 74. Ramgobind v. Askrit Singh A.I.R. 1960 Patna 342, 344; Narasayyamma
 v. AndhraBank A I.R. 1960 A.P. 273, 282 ; Kishori Ram v. G. C. Agarwala A.I.R. 1960
 All. 602, 606.
 75. Debabrata Ghose v. Jnanendra A.I.R. 1960 Gal. 381, 386 ; Nirmal Bose v. Union
 of India A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 506, 508-19.
 76. See e.g. Kameschaw Singh v. I.-T. Commr. A.I.R. 1960 Patna 30, 31.
 77. Mukunda Das v. Bidham Chandra A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 67, 74,
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 presented the issues.78 Sometimes the possibility of reversal on other
 grounds prompts the court to comment on a point which the reversal
 would make relevant.79 When the court gives a reason for its dictum
 we may at least feel confident that full consideration has been given to
 the legal questions and that the opinion, therefore, is closer to an alter-
 native holding than obiter dictum. When no reason is given it is open
 to serious doubt if the court has carefully considered its opinion. It
 will sometimes happen that a judge will acknowledge that an opinion is
 unnecessary but then state his conclusions anyway.80
 Two reasons which are usually given are based on the theory that
 time and energy have gone into arguments of counsel and that these
 should not be wasted. In the case of a possible reversal this has some
 weight for it may avoid reargument on a certain issue.81 But where
 the parties to the law suit do not stand to suffer by a reargument, the
 mere fact that the case has been fully argued is no reason to give an
 opinion. The parties have got what they wanted, a settlement of their
 dispute. The litigants' effort may purchase a settlement but not satis-
 faction of their curiosity as to some point of law.82
 In the case of a casual hint or comment,83 it is even more likely
 that the judge has not thought . through the full implications of his
 78. Debabrata Ghose v. Jnanendra A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 381, 386.
 79. Sanyasi Raju v. Karnap padu A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 83, 89 (no definite holding, only
 comments).
 80. Damodaran v. State A.I.R. 1960 Ker. 58, 63 (for finality sake).
 81. cf. paragraphs accompanying footnotes 45-47 concerning the elimination of
 concern among directors of corporations ; both situations present threats of economic
 wastage.
 82. Analogous to the problem of dictum is that of the mootness of a question.
 In both situations no opinion on a legal issue need be given because events have made
 it unnecessary. With dictum the event is the disposition of the case on another
 ground ; with mootness it is the cessation of the dispute because of events outside the
 courtroom.
 In Narendra Nath v. Corp. of Calcutta A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 102, 104 a principle of law was
 clarified because a case had been fully argued and because it " ought to be clarified."
 The issue was the consideration by the municipal council of resolutions of praise and
 censure for the Kerala State government. Political events had reshuffled power in that
 state so that the necessity for moving the resolutions had passed. Without regard for
 the question of mootness, the Court found against the city on an issue of extreme
 importance to the political functioning of the city council.
 And in Guruswamy v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 592, 596 the Court was willing
 to enunciate the law although too great a time had elapsed for any writ to issue and
 nothing could be gained by a declaration.
 83. Other cases where this type of dictum was given are : Sonar Bank v. Cal. Eng .
 College A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 409, 413 ; Bom. Municipal Corp. v. Ramchandra A.I.R. 1960
 Bom. 58, 61 ; Bansidhar v. Ramchandra A.I.R. 1960 M.P. 313, 315.
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 statements. It might be thought that the absence of a definite judicial
 assertion would compensate for the lack of judicial deliberation. But
 we cannot assume that the weight given to casual comments decreases
 with the same rapidity as the judicial thought which went into the
 comment or hint. In fact, we have seen one case where a judicial
 hint was relied upon to the extent of passing a constitutional amend-
 ment.84 It is more likely that a judicial pronouncement, no matter how
 casual, will carry weight with private parties who are attempting to plan
 their activities or are contemplating litigation. It is no answer to say
 that no one should rely on dictum, especially the casual sort. The
 courts have spoken and the responsibility lies with them to a large ex-
 tent.
 Some High Courts have said that Supreme Court dictum is bind-
 ing. The Bombay High Court has made it clear, however, that such
 dictum must be a " considered opinion ", rather than a " passing casual
 observation " and must be on a point which "arose for determination"
 in the case.85 This would normally exclude the type of dictum which
 is too broad for the facts of the case, for in that situation the point on
 which dictum was given would not have " arisen for determination."
 It also excludes those statements of law on points arising for determina-
 tion which are dictum because they fall short of being alternative
 holdings. As we have noted earlier, such pronouncements are dictum
 specifically because they are " casual."
 The dictum which can be binding will, therefore, normally be of the
 type relating to the facts of the case, iģ.*., arising for determination in
 the case, but made unnecessary for decision because of another state-
 ment of law.86 An example from a High Court case will serve to ex-
 plain this kind of dictum. In DebiSoren v. State 87 the High Court found
 the defendants innocent of sedition ; but they also said that the sedi-
 tion law was constitutional in several pages of obviously " considered "
 opinion. This discussion was not a link in the chain of reasoning
 84. Sec text accompanying footnotes 68-70.
 85. K . P. Doctor v. State of Bombay (FB) A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 220, 224 (held,
 Supreme Court dictum was casual so not binding) ; Mohandas Issar das v. A, N, Satta -
 tuUhan A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 113, 1 15-17 (Supreme Court dictum was on a point not arising
 for determination so not binding, p. 118).
 86. The one exception to this is the unusual case, noted in footnote 62, where
 the broader proposition of law " arises for determination " and is " considered " to thç
 explicit exclusion of the narrower issue.
 87. A.I.R. 195% ratna 254.
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 necessary for the holding of the case, for constitutionality would have
 been pertinent tq the judgment only if the defendants were guilty
 under the sedition law. Nor could it stand independently as an alter-
 native holding since it was not dispositive of the case. Nonetheless,
 this issue " arose for determination " since at the outset counsel could
 not be sure his clients would be found innocent of acting seditiously.
 To consider such dictum, if given by the Supreme Court, as bind-
 ing is to show arļ especial fondness for obiter which is not in keeping
 with the usual rule that only legal statements which resolve a dispute
 are binding. It is an example of the Indian courts' refusal to engage
 in expounding law only when they are required to settle a dispute, a
 tendency which also finds expression in taking cases of doubtful
 maturity. However, the Bombay High Court is far from endorsing all
 types of Supreme Court dictum,88 as the Allahabad High Court has
 apparently done.89 The latter Court's position is extreme in its in-
 clusion of casual judicial assertions among that dictum which is
 binding.
 However, we do not wish to imply that casual dictum of whatever
 kind is to be totally ignored, even if it is not to be binding. We have
 already noted its creative utility in the dialogue of higher and lower
 courts, a dialogue which is expressly dependent upon dictum not being
 binding. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has, in fact, asserted its right
 to use Supreme Court statements which go beyond the ratio decidendi
 of the case if it finds them useful, even if it refuses to be bound by
 them.90
 IV. Conclusion
 We have seen a tendency on the part of Indian courts to adjudi-
 cate in many situations where a case was of doubtful maturity and to
 issue obiter dictum. The reasons for this willingness may become more
 apparent from a brief comparison with the attitude of the United
 States federal courts. The U.S. federal courts have usually approached
 the issue of prematurity, more often called ripeness, as a constitutional
 88. In fact, the Bombay High Court decision to follow bupreme Court dictum is
 itself dictum ; for in both cases where it asserted the binding nature of Supreme Court
 dictum (see fn. 85), it refused to follow the highest Court's statements, because they
 were either casual or on a point not arising for determination.
 89. Union of India v. Firm Ram Gopal A.I.R. 1960 AU. 672, 680 (manner and
 circumstance of pronouncement of dictum immaterial).
 9Q, Surąjmal v. M.P. A.I.R* 1958 M.P. 103, 110-11.
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 question based on the terms " case or controversy " in Article III of
 the U.S. Constitution.91 The Indian courts have treated the matter
 as one of discretion, considering the advantages and disadvantages of
 judicial review.92 This difference in approach has meant a greater
 unwillingness in U.S. federal courts to take cases of doubtful maturity.
 That is not to say that there are no U.S. federal cases which advo-
 cate a more flexible approach. The dissent in the Boyd case 93 and the
 majority in th eStorer and CBS cases 94 show a concern for the doubts of
 citizens and for the dilemmas in which they can be placed by legislation
 or other governmental action. The passage and upholding of the
 constitutional validity of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the dis-
 cretionary approach to this form of relief also indicate that the U.S.
 federal courts are growing more flexible.95 However, this develop-
 ment is comparatively recent. There is still a large body of judicial
 opinion resisting this development. In India the main trend is in
 favour of flexibility and towards giving judgment in cases of doubtful
 maturity or issuing obiter dictum. There is no significant body of
 opinion against this approach and, in fact, there is little sentiment
 that this is even a problem.
 The fact that the U.S. federal courts' trend away from rigidity in
 this matter is recent may give us a clue to the reasons for Indian
 leniency. The Indian Constitution is a 20th century product. It is
 now a commonplace generalization that the spread of governmental
 activity into many spheres of life has vastly complicated modern liv-
 ing.96 The sense of oppression and uncertainty that comes from the
 intrusion of the government is a potentially disruptive factor in con-
 temporary life. General dissatisfaction, if allowed to fester, could grow
 91. Davis, ° Ripeness for Judicial Review," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1122, 1133 (1955) ;
 and see fn. 2.
 92. See fn. 7.
 93. Internatianal L . & W. Union v. Boyd 98 L. Ed. 650, 652 (1953) 347 U.S. 222.
 94. See footnotes 29 & 36.
 95. For a while it was expected that a Declaratory Judgment Act would be un-
 constitutional due to Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n. 72 L. Ed. 880 (1928), 277 U.S.
 274 ; but such an act was held constitutional in Aetna Life Ins . Co. v. Haworth 81 L.Ed.
 617 (1937); 300 U.S. 227 (declaratory judgment not the same as advisory opinion, at
 p. 622 of L. Ed.). However, the power to give declaratory judgments is discretionary
 within the constitutional limits of the power of the judiciary to decide cases and
 controversies; Developments in the Law, Declaratory Judgments 194-1-1949, 62 Harv.
 L. Rev . 787,805-17 (1949).
 96. State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy A.I.R. 1953 S.G. 53, 58 (increasing complexity
 of modern life urges a quick settlement of disputes, here involving labour trouble) .
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 out of hand. This is especially true when the government is attempt-
 ing democratic revolutions involving deep inroads into ancient vested
 interests.97
 The dangers of allowing a dispute to develop are, therefore, much
 greater than in earlier days. The social value in preventing disputes
 and of resolving doubts which are nascent disputes increases.98 In
 terms of our original analysis, other channels of settlement seem fraught
 with danger and so courts are more often resorted to. It is, of course,
 true that the 20th century has come to the United States also, bringing
 with it governmental impingement upon private affairs. But the Indian
 experience is different. We have already mentioned the degree of
 change which is being brought about in India. It is also true that the
 latent forces of division due to great varieties of linguistic, cultural,
 religious and social groups are continually near the surface. The goal
 of settling disputes by means other than private or political channels
 seems sufficiently urgent so that the limits of judicial competence may
 be stretched further than in the U.S. federal courts.99
 Indian conditions provide another reason for stretching the
 capacity of the courts to handle cases of doubtful maturity to the limit.
 The paralysis of private planning and the wastage of human energy
 arising from doubts and mistakes concerning the law are major social
 evils in a country emerging from centuries of economic standstill.100 It
 may be worthwhile to gamble with the courts' prestige in a premature
 grappling with large social issues rather than run the risk of time-
 consuming political solution or a period of paralysis of activity due to
 doubts and dilemmas. This statement of the reasons behind the Indian
 willingness to overlook some of the risks of prematurity is in no way
 meant to detract from the serious risks which we have earlier pointed
 out. But it does indicate that the role allotted to the judicial system
 97. See e.g. land reform cases in footnotes 25 & 42.
 98. See M.V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India (1960) p. 439 (courts
 prevents conflicts just as preventive medicine is administered by doctors); A. T. Mar kose,
 Judicial Control of Administrative Action in India ( 1956) p. 605 (complexity of modern
 age changes concept of the court from a provider of remedies for violated rights to
 legal experts telling litigants about the law which they are willing to obey as
 gentlemen).
 99. Sheoshanker v. M.P. State Gov't. A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 58, 59 adopted the stricter
 U.S. federal rule as the Indian approach. However, the flexibility we have so far
 noted (see fn. 7) indicates that this is not the Indian rule.
 100. cf. discussion of Companies Act, 1956, at footnotes 45-47 and accompanying
 text.
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 must be considered not only in the light of these risks and limitations >
 but also with the needs of the society for judicial settlement in mind.
 These needs indicate that the goal of judicial resolution of disputes is
 especially important in India.
 It is also necessary for us to examine more closely the reality of
 these major risks which the Indian courts must face in deciding cases of
 doubtful maturity and in issuing obiter dictum. The U.S. Supreme
 Court, in its inception, tread a very careful course for the very reason
 that it lacked a sense of security that its word would be obeyed.101 It
 had a keen sense of awarness of the reservoir of public goodwill which
 it could command. However, the Indian Supreme Court was born
 secure in the assurance that it had the power of judicial review of
 statutes.102 This is both important in itself and symptomatic of a basic
 attitude of confidence in the Supreme Court that is more pervading
 than in the United States. This basic attitude makes the element of
 risk less of a danger than would originally appear.
 In India, courts are considered absolutely impartial. They are the
 one place and the judges are the one group of people in whom the
 public can repose complete confidence when the vast administrative
 machinery appears arbitrary and capricious. They are unequivocally
 styled the protectors of Fundamental Rights and guardians of the
 Constitution.103 One author has contrasted the strict impartiality and
 freedom from politics of Indian courts with the situation in the United
 States where there may be a suspicion that the courts are not always
 free from political influence.104 Whether the appraisal of the U.S. or
 Indian courts is accurate or not is immaterial. The crucial point is
 the sense of confidence in Indian courts which this author's attitude
 reflects. The way in which Indian courts are looked upon as repositories
 101. Hudson, " Advisory Opinions of National and International Court", 37
 Harv L. Rev. 970, 976 (1924).
 102. Article 32 gives the power to the Supreme Court to enforce Fundamental
 Rights ; a similar power is given to High Courts by Article 226. Article 13 (2) makes
 it clear that laws abridging such rights are void. A similar result in the United
 States was reached only by judicial interpretation ; Marbury v. Madison 2 L. Ed. 60
 (1803).
 103. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 124, 126-27.
 By contrast, only a minority of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court char-
 acterize themselves as protectors of fundamental liberties : see e.g. Barenblatt v. US. 3
 L. Ed. 2d 1115, 11139 (1959), 360 U.S. 109 (Black, J., dissenting) (courts are guardians
 of the Bill of Rights).
 104. Sharma, p. 307,
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 of impartiality and legal wisdom may explain why they are inclined to
 give obiter dictum when there is no urgency for the settlement of a
 dispute at all. For the very bestowal of great respect upon courts may
 encourage them to view their function of expounding law as independent
 of their role as settlors of disputes.105
 There are other signs of this exalted position of the courts. When
 a constitutional issue is involved in a case it may be removed to the
 High Court.106 When there is a substantial question of constitutional
 law involved there is a right of appeal to the Supreme Court.107 This
 must be reflection of the great prestige and weight which higher court
 judgments carry and of a feeling that such important questions belong
 in those courts. Significantly, in the U.S. federal system, there is no
 right of appeal to the Supreme Court merely by virtue of a constitu-
 tional question being involved,108 and the Court of Appeals (roughly
 comparable to the High Courts) does not get a case until the lower
 court is finished with it regardless of its constitutional content.
 The attitude towards contempt of court from newspaper articles
 reflects the ready willingness to punish attacks on this judicial prestige.
 There is an obvious sense of the need to guard this prestige which
 springs from a sense of the importance of the public image.109
 Similarly, Article 211 of the Constitution forbids legislative discussion
 of the activity of the High Courts or the Supreme Court in the
 discharge of their duties.
 Furthermore, there is no feeling in the Indian tradition of high
 regard for the litigious minded person anxious to pursue his self-
 interest. Either self-effacement or resort to the advice of wiser
 and elder personages might often be preferred in comparison with
 the pressing of an adverse claim. The Supreme Court itself may
 derive some of its special prestige from an unconscious association
 with such a distinguished body of elders. And the tendency to
 105. Sharma, at p. 305 and Ch. X notes approvingly the practice of making
 asides and off-hand comments by the Indian Supreme Court while stating that it is
 not normal for courts of high status and is disliked by " professional M lawyers.
 106. Article 228 of the Constitution of India.
 107. Substantiality in Article 132(3) means only that a difference of opinion
 exists, not that the issue is of general importance ; Jang Bahudin v. Mohindra College
 A.I.R. 1950 Pepsu 61.
 108. The Court's discretion must be appealed to ; 28 U.S.C.A. 1254 (1) (from
 Courts of Appeal in federal system) and 1257 (3) (from state courts).
 109. Asunni Kumar v. Arabinda Rose A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 75, 76 (apology for impugn-
 ing Court's motives).
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 accept the courts' role in cases of doubtful maturity could be
 based on a tradition of respect for the body of elders who would
 bring relief from the pressures of a nascent dispute in an uncontentious
 proceeding.110
 A further factor which contributes to a sympathy with the courts'
 tendency to deal with more abstract cases is the teaching system in law
 colleges throughout most of India. Students are not confronted with
 the case-method of study or the Socratic (question-answer) method of
 teaching except in a few isoltated cases. This fosters an attitude
 which views the law less as concrete applications of social policy and
 more as abstract general propositions. This helps to explain why the
 Allahabad High Court could base its opinion that Supreme Court
 obiter is binding upon Article 141 of the Constitution which says that
 "law declared by the Supreme Court" is binding.111 For it is only a
 conception of law as generalizations which can include obiter dictum
 within its definition.
 The foregoing analysis indicates that the capital of good will and
 respect upon which the courts may draw when deciding cases of
 doubtful maturity or issuing obiter dictum is much greater than might
 at first be apparent. This respect for the courts suggests that the power
 to settle disputes which are volatile or which would otherwise receive
 political attention is fairly secure since the social pressure and individual
 inclination to accept the courts' decision is great. Whatever risks there
 may be of loss of prestige from interference in private and political
 matters may, therefore, be worth taking.
 The truth of this assertion cannot be fully tested, however, until
 the ruling party in India loses its present over whelming majority,
 capable of easily amending the Constitution. Until now governments
 disapproval of a judicial pronouncement has led to easy revision of the
 basic law. The full clash can only occur in the future and the courts'
 prestige will then be fully tried. It must also be remembered that the
 courts' prestige is no remedy for undeveloped facts and an excessive
 judicial workload.
 Moreover, the danger of judicial over-confidence remains. Social
 upheavals unleash energies which the most respected of courts may not
 110. Ghattopadhyaya, Traditional Values in Indian Life (Indian International
 Centre, 1961) p. 29.
 111. Union of India v. Firm Ram Gopal A.I.R. 1960 All. 672, 680»
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 be able to settle. Erosion is a slow process.112 The extent to which it
 has occurred can only be known when put to the test. If it is
 true that the reservoir of respect for the judiciary is limited, however
 great it may be, the courts must consider that someday they may need
 all of their prestige to meet a particular challenge. At that time it
 will matter if the court has judicially conserved its strength. The giving
 of decisions in cases of doubtful maturity and of obiter dictum is one
 potential source of exhausting that strength.113.
 112. One possible source of erosion already exists in the compulsory retirement
 age for judges. Suspicions may grow that the appointments of judges after retire-
 ment to various positions will gradually lead them to temper opinions which are
 anti-government .
 113. In another Article " Advisory Opinions in Tndia " (to be published in
 Vol. IV No. 3 of this Journal) the author tests some of the hypotheses developed above.
 The problems of maturity of facts for an accurate and effective decision and the risk
 attendant upon a court's unnecessarily intruding into private and political affairs are
 further examined. [Ed.]
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